


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One Step Forward and Two Steps Back: The Slow Process of Re-establishing Diplomatic Relations between Germany and Turkey after the First World War

HATİCE BAYRAKTAR & RAMAZAN ÇALIK

The relationship between Germany and Turkey in the interwar period of the last century was not untroubled and smooth but was rather a very changeable and delicate one. This is hardly surprising as in each country major political events took place at that time. In Germany these were the transition from the German Empire under Wilhelm II into the Weimar Republic in 1918, its political decline and Hitler's coming into power in 1933.¹ From the Turkish point of view, the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish War of Liberation (1919–23) and, consequently, the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 count among the most important events.²

In this article, emphasis will be put on the re-establishment of official diplomatic relations between Turkey and Germany after the First World War, spanning the years from 1918 to 1924. So far, the topic of German–Turkish relations in that period and even that of the whole interwar period has been examined only marginally.³ Exceptions include work by Cemil Kocak, who put special emphasis on Ankara's attitude vis-à-vis Berlin,⁴ and an article by Yücel Güçlü in which he studies economic aspects.⁵ The present study, however, focuses on relations between the two states as regards foreign policy mainly in the very first years and, making extensive use of German archival sources, stresses not Ankara's but rather Berlin's perception of their mutual relations.

The ties between Turkey and Germany can be traced back to the eighteenth century. From the outgoing nineteenth century on, their ties became closer and went far beyond the sole maintenance of diplomatic relations, ranging from similar interests concerning the policy of alliances over economical questions, namely the construction of the Baghdad Railway, to co-operation in the military field.⁶ In the First World War, the German and Ottoman Empires were allies, and co-operation went to such lengths that members of the German military mission were even given command over the Ottoman army.⁷ The military co-operation continued until 1918 when the mission was revoked from the Ottoman side, and with the armistice of Mudros (October 1918) all German military personnel had to leave Ottoman lands.⁸ Yet the restrictions imposed on the Sultan's Empire at Mudros went beyond the

military only by the obligation to break off relations with the Central Powers,⁹ i.e. the German Empire, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Kingdom of Bulgaria. All German citizens were expelled from the Ottoman Empire, and no German citizen was allowed to enter the country from then on.¹⁰

Shortly after, the Ottoman and German Empires underwent fundamental changes. In Germany, a revolution broke out and, soon after, the German Empire (1871–1918) was succeeded by the Weimar Republic (1919–33). For the German Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt, AA) the change from monarchy to republic was connected with structural changes. Henceforth the ministry was led by the Minister of Foreign Affairs (Reichsminister des Auswärtigen).¹¹ He was supported by a state secretary who presided over the departments of the AA, each of which had specific tasks.¹² Matters relating to Turkey were dealt with by Department III within the AA, which from 1922 was responsible for the British Empire, America and the Orient.¹³ This structure was maintained until 1936.¹⁴

In Turkey, the political leaders from the Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti, CUP) fled the country, leaving behind Sultan Mehmet VI Vahdettin, whose sphere of control did not stretch beyond the Istanbul (Constantinople) region. Mainly in Anatolia, opposition formed against the claims of the victorious Entente powers for further dismemberment of the country. During the course of the Turkish War of Liberation (1919–22), the national resistance movement emerged as a major political player. With the Treaty of Lausanne (1923), the new Turkish government under Mustafa Kemal was internationally recognized and, shortly after, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed.¹⁵

The early phase of the relationship between Mustafa Kemal's nationalist government and the Weimar Republic may best be characterized as a slow process of rapprochement which proceeded in a rather reluctant and cautious manner. This becomes clear from their first contact that is documented in the Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes, PAAA). In February 1922 Ferid Bey, Ankara's representative in Paris, approached the German ambassador there and asked for a meeting. Ambassador Keller agreed but then the Turkish representative cancelled the meeting because of illness.¹⁶ Somehow the press got wind of the appointment, and the German ambassador hastily released a *dementi* in which he denied having had any conversations with representatives of Ankara.¹² Keller's superiors at the Foreign Ministry in Berlin considered this an overreaction, keeping in mind the prospective relationship with the Turkish nationalists, and advised against being too reserved.¹⁸ However, shortly after the German ambassador's *dementi* in Paris the Turkish side released a similar statement, and a delegation from the Turkish nationalist government in Paris declared that Ankara did not entertain any relations with Germany and that in the whole of Anatolia there were no Germans at all.¹⁹

Finally, and still in spring 1922, the prospects for the establishment of official German–Turkish relations worsened even further with the murder of Talaat Pasha and two other CUP members by Armenians in Berlin and the manner in which the incidents were dealt with by the German public and the police,²⁰ a development which the AA tried to work against.²¹

Basically, and irrespective of the troubles mentioned above, in 1922 the governments in Berlin and Ankara were both aware that it was still too early for the establishment

of official missions also out of consideration for the Entente powers and former agreements with them, not forgetting the fact that the political situation in Turkey was far from being completely clear.²² Nevertheless, Ankara let the AA know that a (semi-official) contact from the German side would be very welcome,²³ a view that even İsmet İnönü, then Turkish foreign minister and chief negotiator of the Turkish delegation at the Lausanne conference, took when talking to the German ambassador in Romania in February 1923.²⁴

At that time communication between Berlin and Ankara still had to be either through representatives outside the two countries or with the help of a third party. At least from 1922 onwards much of the Turkish–German communication was achieved with the help of Swedish diplomats.²⁵ In view of these complicated means of communication it is hardly surprising that the AA was sometimes left with contradictory information from Turkey.²⁶ This was not only due to errors arising in the transmission of messages but, as the AA learnt from an interview given by Rıza Nur, the second negotiator of the Turkish delegation at Lausanne, also because in the higher echelons of the Turkish government some misunderstanding of the political situation between the two countries had occurred. Rıza Nur, for example, was of the opinion that the Treaty of Versailles was an obstacle which hindered Germany building diplomatic relations with the nationalist regime in Ankara, a view which the AA could not understand at all. Berlin took the position that none of the international treaties involving Turkey or Germany presented a barrier, namely the Treaty of Versailles (1919), that of Lausanne (1923) or the Armistice of Mudania (1922) which had succeeded the Armistice of Mudros (1918).²⁷

Interestingly, the AA itself displayed different behaviour than could have been expected from its attitude. Even with the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on 24 July 1923,²⁸ the ministry was reluctant to undertake the first official steps towards diplomatic relations and wanted to await the Treaty's ratification first,²⁹ which was carried out by the Turkish National Assembly the following month.³⁰ Still in July, and maybe persuaded to do so after representatives of various ministries occupied with economic questions had stressed the importance of German economic interests in Turkey,³¹ German Foreign Minister von Rosenberg charged one of his co-workers to question his Turkish colleague İsmet İnönü at Lausanne. As it turned out, the Turkish foreign minister also did not want to press ahead with the developments: when asked about a suitable timescale for the renewal of diplomatic relations İnönü clearly sidestepped and declared his government would take the initial steps. Probably in order to soften his answer he added that this hopefully would happen before the end of the year but more likely not before the Allies' withdrawal from Istanbul.³²

At least some progress was made in the economic sector. Thus, according to a report from September 1923, various Turkish delegations had come to Berlin, such as the commission for schooling in search of teaching aids, and a delegation looking for information about how to construct a slaughter-house, and, in addition, the Turkish minister for the economy had tried to find a German director-general for the *Banque agricole*.³³

In October 1923 the last allied troops finally left Istanbul, the Turkish national army moved in³⁴ and the Turkish Republic was officially proclaimed.³⁵ From the German point of view all obstacles to official Turkish–German relations had been removed in accordance with international law.³⁶ Yet the ministry was worried about

some negative statements about Germany which Mustafa Kemal, then President of the Republic of Turkey, had allegedly made in an interview with a Turkish journalist.³⁷ It turned out that the article about the alleged interview had been taken from an American newspaper without further examination and that probably there had never been such an interview.³⁸

By the time that point had been clarified, the AA was urged by Consul General von Wesendonck not to wait much longer to establish official relations with Turkey for economic considerations.³⁹ The AA was further informed that some Turkish politicians had started to wonder why such steps had not been undertaken some time before and that others, among them the Turkish Minister for Economic Affairs Feisi, Justice Secretary Seid Bey, and all leading military officers, wanted Germany to establish relations quickly.⁴⁰ But the AA also received some opposing news: Wallenberg, the head of the Swedish legation in Istanbul, had been informed by the representative of the Turkish Foreign Ministry in Istanbul, Adnan Bey, that his government would like to establish diplomatic relations with Germany but only after the conclusion of a German–Turkish treaty of friendship.⁴¹ In view of the fact that the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy had agreed to send ambassadors to Istanbul but not to Ankara, Ambassador Wallenberg recommended awaiting further developments.⁴²

The AA tried to meet expectations and decided to postpone further any steps in the direction of official relations with Ankara. But, as Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann himself explained, there would be no way to avoid the suggested contract because of German economic interests and because of Turkish surprise about the hesitant German behaviour.⁴³ The notified contract of friendship itself was met with some understanding by the AA, and the ministry regarded it as being brought forth from Turkey's self-conception as a new political entity which needed to become established and to form the basic principles for international relations.⁴⁴ Foreign Minister Stresemann tried to make sure that the Turkish government was notified of Berlin's approval of a German–Turkish treaty of friendship and sent a telegram to the German Legation in Stockholm, asking the Swedish government to forward the message to Ankara through Envoy Wallenberg in Istanbul. Stresemann had also announced that the German legate in Romania, Freytag, would be charged with the signing of the contract.⁴⁵

In fact, compared to its former allies Germany was a laggard since by December 1923 Bulgaria had already built up relations with Turkey and both Hungary and Austria had entered into negotiations with Ankara.⁴⁶ The German–Turkish rapprochement, on the other hand, suffered from its indirect methods of communication: somehow the Swedish ambassador in Istanbul either missed or misunderstood some bits of information passed to him because he enquired of his German colleague Freytag in Bucharest when his arrival in Turkey could be expected. Legate Freytag himself must have been taken by surprise because at that time he had not received any such instructions from his superiors in Berlin. Unfortunately, the AA was further informed that a British news agency, the Exchange AA, had already announced that Freytag was travelling to Ankara for negotiations with the Turkish government.⁴⁷ In order not to lose control over the development completely, the AA urged the German representative in Stockholm to ask the Swedish government whether it had already received new information from Legate Wallenberg in Istanbul because authentic knowledge about the Turkish point

of view was necessary for Berlin.⁴⁸ The AA also instructed the German Embassy in London precisely how to answer any questions concerning the actual state of German–Turkish relations,⁴⁹ and Legate Freytag in Bucharest was for the first time informed by his superiors in Berlin about his task in Turkey.⁵⁰

One day later, and while already making the necessary preparations for Freytag's negotiations with the Turkish government, the AA finally received the awaited answer from Ankara. By then Legate Nadolny in Stockholm had learnt from the Swedish government that the Turkish government was ready for negotiations but wished these to take place in Ankara instead of Istanbul.⁵¹ The AA agreed and instructed Ambassador Freytag in Bucharest to set out on his journey to Istanbul as soon as possible, also providing him with a draft of the Treaty of Friendship. Freytag too was authorized to declare that the German government was ready for further agreements with Turkey, covering such topics as legal protection or trade.⁵²

A rather interesting fact which turned up in the letter is that, despite its intention to wait for the sending of legations by the Entente powers to Turkey, the AA considered the establishment of a consulate general in Smyrna, thereby following the example of Ankara of establishing consulates in France, Great Britain and Italy prior to the uptake of official relations with those countries, and also that of Great Britain which the AA believed to have such institutions in Istanbul and Smyrna as well.⁵³ Seemingly, during the process of establishing diplomatic relations and representations after the First World War it was most common among European countries and Turkey to set up a complicated system of representatives, starting with single unofficial representations over (general) consulates to the final official embassies.

In the effort to avoid any resentment on the part of the British government, the AA also confided details about Envoy Freytag's task in Turkey to Lord D'Abernon, the British Ambassador in Berlin, and also instructed the German Ambassador in London to declare, if asked, that Germany would wait for the establishment of diplomatic relations by the Great Powers, i.e. Great Britain, irrespective of agreement of an immediate uptake of diplomatic relations in the draft Turkish–German friendship treaty.⁵⁴

In the meantime, Ambassador Freytag was preparing for his departure to Istanbul, and in the last week of January 1924 he informed the AA that this was scheduled for 12 February 1924.⁵⁵ The AA was not satisfied with this rather generous timetable, and Assistant Secretary of State von Schubert requested an immediate explanation of the reasons underlying his journey being scheduled more than a month after having been instructed to do so.⁵⁶ A telegram with roughly the same content followed only three days later, this time sent by State Secretary Ago von Maltzan himself, who ordered Freytag to begin his journey without further delay.⁵⁷ Legate Freytag, thus put under pressure, explained in a telegram that he had been informed by a co-worker (Holstein) that the Turkish side would prefer to negotiate not only about the friendship agreement but also about agreements concerning trade and settlement, and that there had also arisen questions concerning travel to Turkey and Freytag's accommodation there. In detail Freytag explained that the only possibility he saw would be to hire club cars from the Anatolian railway company because the Turkish side was not willing to provide the cars and other accommodation could not be found. Obviously Freytag judged the rent rather high

since he gave exact figures for the cost. Nevertheless, he considered the hire of club cars to be inevitable.⁵⁸

By then, the topic of Freytag's departure and the start of German–Turkish negotiations had become a major topic at the AA, because only one day later State Secretary von Maltzan himself again cabled to Freytag to approve the hire of the club cars if no other possibilities for accommodation were to be found in Ankara. In respect of the negotiable Turkish–German agreements, von Maltzan reminded Freytag of the instructions received in early January which dealt with all the topics sufficiently.⁵⁹ Obviously, the AA was still not quite satisfied with the way in which Freytag was performing his duties. The latter, however, tried to improve his standing, and in his next telegram he told the AA that instead of choosing the cheaper ship passage, which would be possible only by 12 February, he now preferred to travel over land via Belgrade, starting on 7 February, in order to follow the directive to speed up his journey.⁶⁰

As emerged a few days later, Freytag had had several reasons for his plans to start his journey comparatively late. On 11 February 1924 the AA received a letter from Freytag, written on 18 January 1924, in which Freytag explained that on 2 February the Austrian Chancellor was expected to visit Bucharest and that he, Freytag, deemed it politically advantageous to stay in the Romanian capital during that time. Furthermore, he himself was receiving dental treatment which could not be postponed and which would last a further 10 to 14 days.⁶¹

In the end Freytag arrived in Istanbul on 10 February 1924.⁶² Obviously, he was very successful in his negotiations because five days later he could report to the AA that the Turkish side had agreed to sign an agreement of friendship.⁶³ Unfortunately, Legate Freytag had had to find out in Istanbul that Adnan Bey, who was acting as the representative of the Ankara government there, had no authorization to negotiate. As Freytag had already been informed in Bucharest by his Turkish colleague, Ismet Pasha (Ismet İnönü) wanted to meet him in Ankara for personal discussion though, as Adnan then explained, Ismet had gone to Smyrna for a week. At least the talks between Freytag and Adnan Bey were not completely in vain since some details of the agreement of friendship on which the Turkish and German sides disagreed could be identified.⁶⁴ Upon receiving the report the AA, again through the legation in Stockholm, provided Freytag with precise instructions how to deal with the points in question, namely the consular connections and the most-favoured-nation clause.⁶⁵

Freytag, in the meantime answering questions from the Turkish press,⁶⁶ had to wait until 26 February for a first meeting with Ismet Pasha in Ankara. The negotiations did not start too well since the Turkish politician declared he was interested in a quick posting of legates, a wish that contradicted the German intention to await the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Great Powers and Turkey before undertaking similar steps. In his telegram to the AA, Freytag developed several strategies on how to postpone such a step without directly rejecting the Turkish wish. As Freytag concluded, without a satisfactory answer the Turkish government would hardly be willing to accept a German consulate in Smyrna.⁶⁷ Freytag was right because the Turkish side denied consular relations as a matter of principle.⁶⁸ However, after several consultations with the AA in Berlin and further debates in Ankara Freytag could report that the government there had

agreed to the establishment of a consulate for a period of two years after the conclusion of the German–Turkish Treaty of Friendship.⁶⁹ The other points in question could also be clarified, and at the beginning of March 1924 Envoy Freytag finally signed the Treaty.⁷⁰ The agreement asserted the friendship between Germany and Turkey, fixed the intention of establishing diplomatic relations, foresaw the conclusion of treaties concerning settlement, consular representations and trade and provided details about how the treaty was to be ratified and put into force.⁷¹

The treaty was soon ratified in both countries, and on 1 May 1924 the instruments of ratification were exchanged in Istanbul.⁷²

With this treaty, the first milestone for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Turkish and German Republics was reached. Soon after, and still in March 1924, the discussion about possible candidates for the position of German envoy to Turkey was already ongoing. Nadolny, at that time German representative at the German legation in Sweden, was chosen as most suitable for the position, and therefore Swedish Envoy Wallenberg in Istanbul cautiously requested Adnan Bey to contact his government to enquire whether Nadolny would be welcome in Turkey.⁷³

Apart from the question of whom to send to Turkey the problem also arose as to which form of diplomatic mission Germany was to establish in Turkey: an embassy or a legation.⁷⁴ The decision strongly depended on the form of diplomatic representation the most important powers of the Entente, namely Great Britain, were going to choose. But because in spring 1924 the Treaty of Lausanne had not been ratified in all signatory countries and therefore was not yet in force,⁷⁵ the British Empire had not decided upon the question of embassy or legation. In an effort to postpone the decision, the AA opted to give Nadolny, the chosen candidate as Germany's diplomatic representative, the personal title of Ambassador, irrespective of whether he would head an embassy or legation.⁷⁶ In fact, the Foreign Office in London did not object to this plan for which, as the British government had noticed, Italy had recently set a precedent. Moreover, the British also intended to deal with the matter of legation versus embassy in a rather peculiar and individual manner since London had decided to delegate an ambassador to Istanbul whereas Ankara was to receive a British minister only.⁷⁷

Just a few days later the AA received some controversial information. First, Legationsrat Padel, the head of the political department dealing with the Turkish matters at the AA and at that time in Istanbul for the exchange of the instruments of ratification, stated that the Turkish government was not happy with the 'Italian formula'. Turkey, recognizing Germany's peculiar international standing, would be satisfied if Germany were to send a *chargé d'affaires*, whose status could be changed later into that of an ambassador. Yet, as Legationsrat Padel further announced, the Turkish government asked for a regular German presence in Turkey.⁷⁸ Second, and contrary to the information the AA had received from London only a few days before, the British government reminded the AA through Ambassador D'Abernon not to come to a decision in respect to the title of the German representative in Turkey prior to further contact with the government in London.⁷⁹

After the exchange of instruments of ratification of the German–Turkish friendship treaty, official diplomatic relations to Turkey had to be established rather quickly. Therefore, State Secretary von Maltzan had his Assistant Secretary of State von Schubert send an urgent request to the German embassy in London. The

representatives there were to enquire at the Foreign Office as to whether the sending of Nadolny as chargé d'affaires and providing him with the personal title of Ambassador would be acceptable to London. The AA laid special emphasis on the fact that this proposal was to be regarded as a compromise between Germany's original intention to accredit an ambassador instead of a chargé d'affaires and British wishes.⁸⁰

As it turned out, the issue of contradictory signals from London had been caused by the fact that the Foreign Office co-worker who had earlier talked to the German representative had not recorded all the details of the conversation, which, in consequence, had resulted in the latest message from the British government to the AA. Other than this bit of information, nothing could be found by the German representative in London since all those in charge at the Foreign Office were away.⁸¹ In the meantime, the Turkish government had accepted the appointment of Nadolny as German legate instead of as German ambassador. On the other side, Ankara had not accepted the proposal to provide Nadolny with the personal status of ambassador.⁸² Upon this news the AA urged its embassy in London to ask for final approval from the British government,⁸³ which followed one day later.⁸⁴

Having been accepted by the Turkish government as the prospective first German legate to the Turkish Republic, Nadolny, until then working at the legation in Stockholm, made his way to Istanbul. He arrived there on 3 June 1924 and was formally introduced to Adnan Bey, the representative of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, by the Swedish Legate Wallenberg. The official presentation of Nadolny's letter of accreditation was to take place in Ankara, an event for which Nadolny anticipated technical problems because the capital in inner Anatolia only provided accommodation for a single legate. In consideration of the ongoing negotiations between the Turkish government and the representatives of several foreign states about the conclusion of friendship agreements Nadolny decided to travel there by train in a special wagon in which he also planned to reside during his stay in Ankara, a strategy to solve the problem of where to stay in the still underdeveloped capital Ankara which had also been used by the Italian delegate earlier.⁸⁵

Afterwards, Nadolny headed the German legation in Istanbul. In the long run the legation was projected to move to Ankara, for which purpose an appropriate building had yet to be constructed. In 1924 not only the German legation but also a German consulate general was established. The latter was located in Smyrna and headed by Geheimrat Padel, who was in office already by August of that year.⁸⁶

With the delegation of Nadolny as German legate to Turkey, relations between Germany and Turkey which had been abandoned five years before were re-established. The rapprochement process can be followed in detail in documents from the archive of the AA. The sources reveal that the whole process was not a straightforward one but was rather marked by a succession of small steps back and forth. Naturally, relations between the two countries depended on inner political developments and matters concerning the relationship of the two countries, as for example the murder of prominent CUP members in Berlin. At least as important as these individual factors were the international developments and agreements, namely the Armistice of Mudros, the Armistice of Mudanya and the Treaty of Lausanne, which served as a frame which defined how far Turkish–German relations could develop.

In view of these restrictions the situation between the Weimar Republic and the Turkish Republic was not unique but was shared by many other countries, especially those – or their predecessor states – which had belonged to the Central Powers, just like the German Empire and the Ottoman Empire. This study therefore may well stand as an example of how complex and multilayered international relations were in the first years after the end of the First World War.

Finally, this study also displays some amusing aspects, at least when viewed with today's eyes, because it also spotlights the conditions under which diplomatic interactions had to take place in the early 1920s in an era when travellers from Bucharest to Turkey could only choose between passage on a ship and a train ride, and diplomats had to rent whole club cars in order to secure suitable accommodation in the Turkish capital.

Notes

1. See for example G. Mann, *Deutsche Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1992); H. Mommsen, *Aufstieg und Untergang der Republik von Weimar 1918–1933* (Berlin: Ullstein, 1998).
2. See for example E.J. Zürcher, *Turkey. A Modern History* (London: Tauris, 2004).
3. See for example J. Glasneck and I. Kircheisen, *Türkei und Afghanistan – Brennpunkte der Orientpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg* (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1968); H. Kramer, 'Türkei', in G. Hellmann S. Schmidt and R. (eds.), *Handbuch zur deutschen Außenpolitik* (Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2007), pp.482–93; C.-T. Weick, *Die schwierige Balance. Kontinuitäten und Brüche deutscher Türkeipolitik* (Berlin: LIT-Verlag, 2001).
4. See K. Kocak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri 1923–1939* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1991).
5. See Y. Güclü, 'Turkish–German Relations on the Eve of World War Two', *Turkish Studies*, Vol.1, No.2 (2000), pp.73–94.
6. See Weick, *Die schwierige Balance*, pp.10–23.
7. See Zürcher, *Turkey*, p.121. According to Zürcher, at one time more than 700 German officers were working for the Ottoman military.
8. Compare Zürcher, *Turkey*, p.133. Actually, the Ottoman officials went a step further by evicting all German nationals from the Ottoman Empire (see Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereafter PAAA), R78484, record from 27 April 1922 and PAAA, R78484, document III E 638, 23 March 1922).
9. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 3488, AA registry receipt stamp from 14 Dec. 1923.
10. See PAAA, R78485, document III O 346, Padel (German Consulate General for Anatolia) to AA, 9 Aug. 1924.
11. See L. Biewer, 'Die Geschichte des Auswärtigen Amtes. Ein Überblick', <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/de/AAmt/Geschichte/GeschichteAApdf.pdf> (accessed 17 April 2009). From November 1922 until August 1923 the position of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs was filled by Friedrich von Rosenberg. He was followed by Gustav Stresemann (in office August 1923–October 1929), Julius Curtius (October 1929–October 1931), Heinrich Brüning (October 1931–May 1932), Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath (June 1932–January 1938; data according to http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_German_foreign_ministers, accessed 17 April 2009).
12. The position of State Secretary to the German Minister of Foreign Affairs was filled from 1922 to 1924 by Adolf Georg Otto ('Ago') von Maltzan, who was followed by Carl von Schubert (in office 1924–30); compare R. Blessing, *Der mögliche Frieden: Die Modernisierung der Aussenpolitik und die Deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1923–1929* (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2008), p.58.
13. Department III was initially led by Carl von Schubert who, having been nominated as State Secretary, passed his office to Walter de Haas (see *ibid.*).
14. See Blessing, *Der mögliche Frieden*, p.57.
15. See J. Matuz, *Das Osmanische Reich* (Darmstadt: Primus Verlag, 1996), pp.267–9. Official recognition of the nationalist government in Ankara had started two years earlier at the Conference of London (1921). Two delegations from Turkey were there, one being sent by the Ottoman government in

- Istanbul, the other from the Turkish nationalists in Ankara (see *The Times*, ‘Turk Nationalist Schemes’, 10 Feb. 1921). Only one month after the failure of the conference, in March 1921, the Soviet Union and the Turkish nationalist government concluded a friendship treaty (see Matuz, *Das Osmanische Reich*, p. 275).
16. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 362, telegram no. 119, Keller (German Ambassador in Paris, France) to Auswärtiges Amt in Berlin (hereafter AA), 22 Feb. 1922.
 17. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 363, telegram no. 118, Keller (German Embassy Paris) to AA, 22 Feb. 1922.
 18. See PAAA, R78484, document to II E 362/363, undated note. In the note it was further mentioned that even the Sultan’s government, representing the Ottoman Empire and as such obliged to follow the regulations of the armistice of 1918, did not hesitate to send emissaries to Germany for the winding up of economic affairs. According to the AA, neither the political situation nor any contracts required the avoidance of contacts with Turkey, the only possible source of constraints being the armistice of 1918 according to which Turkey had to break off relations with the Central Powers. But, as the ministry further commented, Mustafa Kemal completely ignored the contents of the armistice and had messengers in almost all European capitals, among them Colonel Nuri Bey, who had been placed in the German capital Berlin (as an unofficial representative [comment by the authors]) and was also received at the AA (see *ibid.*).
 19. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 638, 23 March 1922.
 20. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 843, AA to Regierungsrat Weissmann (state commissioner for public order) in Berlin, 26 April 1922; PAAA, R78484, document III E 847, German Embassy in Stockholm, Sweden, to AA, 20 April 1922 and PAAA, R78484, document III E 1021, 15 May 1922.
 21. See first source in previous footnote and PAAA, R78484, note to III E 843, 27 April 1922. Also the AA later tried to avoid incidents which could make a negative impression in Turkey. For example, the AA advised against the publication of a manuscript prepared by a Venezuelan, Rafael de Nogales, about his experiences in Turkey some years before and his negative description of some Turkish politicians. This case is well documented because due to an unfortunate series of events the author himself was targeted with negative reports – an incident which caused quite a bit of unease among the co-workers of the ministry and even had the Foreign Minister order an investigation of the case (see various documents in PAAA, R78484 and R78485).
 22. During that period, some contacts did take place albeit not always by authorized individuals. For example, quite a bit of confusion at the AA was caused by a former member of the Reichswehrministerium who without the authorization or even knowledge of the AA had approached Ankara’s representative in Moscow and enquired whether the Turkish nationalist regime would agree to the despatch of a German representative to Ankara (see PAAA, R78484, note to II E 1290, May 1922 and PAAA, R78484, document III E 1537, Weidenfeld (German Embassy in Moscow) to AA, 15 May 1922). Very likely, Geheimrat Padel from the AA felt awkward when he had to declare the whole matter to be a misunderstanding regarding Ankara’s unofficial representative in Berlin (see PAAA, R78484, handwritten undated note to III E 1290). Interestingly, Ankara reacted positively to the idea of a German representative in the Turkish capital in Anatolia, and soon the matter was discussed again between the Turkish and German sides, this time proposed by a Turkish representative to the German ambassador in Moscow. The latter, however, was bound by a former order from the AA and could do no more than react evasively (see PAAA, R78484, document III E 1442, Weidenfeld (German Embassy in Moscow, then Soviet Union) to AA, 17 July 1922).
 23. See PAAA, R78484, von Wesendonk (German General Consulate in Tiflis, Georgia) to AA, J.No. 3792, 31 Dec. 1922.
 24. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 524, Freytag (German Embassy in Bucharest, Romania) to AA, 11 Feb. 1923.
 25. See e.g. PAAA, R78484, document III E 2716, Berlin, 11 Dec. 1922; PAAA, R78484, document III E 2744, Swedish legation in Berlin, Verbalnote to AA, 12 Dec. 1922 and PAAA, R78484, document III E 2866, German legation in Stockholm to AA, 24 Dec. 1922.
 26. In December 1923, for example, the AA was irritated by the news that Turkey expected Germany to take the first steps to the establishment of Turkish–German relations whereas in September 1922 the German side had been sure that the Mustafa Kemal’s government wanted Germany to wait for a Turkish sign for such steps (see PAAA, R78484, document to III E 3375, telegram no. 258, AA to German Legation in Stockholm, 11 Dec. 1923).

27. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 2186, record, written in Berlin on 27 July 1923 and supplemented with a clipping from *Kölnische Zeitung*.
28. See for example the article 'Friede im Orient', published in *Wiener Morgenzeitung*, 25 July 1923.
29. See PAAA, R78484, document to III E 2205, Berlin, 1 Aug. 1923.
30. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 3488, AA registry receipt stamp from 14 Dec. 1923.
31. See PAAA, R78484, document to III E 2205, Berlin, 1 Aug. 1923.
32. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 2220, record by Prüfer addressed to Reichsminister des Äußeren, Berlin, 27 July 1923.
33. See PAAA, R78484, record III E 2879, Berlin, 22 Sept. 1923.
34. See PAAA, R78484, clipping from *Lokal-Anzeiger*, article entitled 'Die Befreiung der Türkei' of 22 Nov. 1923.
35. See for example 'Die türkische Republik', *Wiener Morgenzeitung*, 31 Oct. 1923. At about the same time, Germany was shaken by unrest and the Hitler-Ludendorff putsch (see for example 'Bürgerkrieg in Deutschland', 'Das Chaos wächst' and 'Der Rechtsputsch niedergeschlagen', published in *Wiener Morgenzeitung*, 24 Oct. 1923, 29 Oct. 1923 and 10 Nov. 1923, respectively). Nevertheless, the AA in Berlin, then already led by Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, tried to continue its work. It should be noted here that despite frequent personal changes in the individual politicians holding the position of the German minister of foreign affairs, the officials in Department III, which was dealing with political relations between Germany and Turkey worked there for many years. For example, the name Padel appears throughout the 1920s in association with Referat Pol 2 Türkei, the subdivision of Department III at the AA which specialized in political affairs concerning Turkey. The same holds true for the name Prüfer, for the head of Referat Pol 2 Türkei.
36. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 3488, AA registry receipt stamp from 14 Dec. 1923.
37. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 3211, AA to Gesandtschaftsrat Holstein (Constantinople) via Swedish Legation there, 12 Nov. 1923. Note: In all German documents from the AA mentioned in this article the city of Istanbul is called 'Konstantinopel'. In the following, the original statement of place will be maintained albeit in its English translation ('Constantinople').
38. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 3415, J.No. 2455, Holstein (Constantinople) to AA, 23 Nov. 1923.
39. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 3438, Berlin, 7 Dec. 1923. Interestingly, the correspondence about the Turkish press article in question was not addressed to the German representative in Stockholm as before but to a co-worker in the AA, Gesandtschaftsrat Holstein. Holstein must have either been placed at the Swedish Legation in Istanbul or must have had close contact with the Swedish representatives there as decrees for him were addressed to the Swedish Legation (see PAAA, R78484, document III E 3211, AA to Gesandtschaftsrat Holstein (Constantinople) via Swedish Legation in Constantinople, 12 Nov. 1923). A record, registered at the AA on 3 Nov. 1923, even indicates the presence of another co-worker in Istanbul, a certain Krauss in the position of Geheimrat. The reason for Krauss' presence was declared to be the assessment of buildings in German possession in the metropolis at the Bosphorus (see PAAA, R78484, record III E 3212, 12 Nov. 1923). Later on in the corresponding dossier only the name Holstein appears sporadically, indicating that at least Krauss no longer worked for the AA in Istanbul or elsewhere in Turkey. However, the sources indicate that the AA tried to position unofficial agents there even when they could not act as official German representatives. Both Holstein and Krauss may have fulfilled a similar task to the unofficial representative the Turkish nationalists had placed in Berlin. In contrast to Krauss, Holstein's name also appears in documents composed afterwards, and in 1924 Holstein worked at the German legation in Istanbul (see PAAA, R78485, Nadolny (German legation Constantinople) to AA, 15 Oct. 1924).
40. See PAAA, R78484, record III E 3454 from Padel (AA), Berlin, 8 Dec. 1923.
41. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 3469, telegram no. B 2331, Nadolny (German legation Stockholm) to AA, 6 Dec. 1923. According to Cemil Kocak the above mentioned name Adnan refers to Adnan Adıvar (compare Kocak, *Türk-Alman İlişkileri*, p.6).
42. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 3469, telegram no. B 2331, Nadolny (German legation Stockholm) to AA, 6 Dec. 1923.
43. See PAAA, R78484, telegram no. 264, Foreign Minister Stresemann to German Legation Stockholm, 15 Dec. 1923. Also in this case legate Nadolny at the German Legation in Sweden was charged with passing the information to the Swedish envoy in Istanbul through the Swedish government.
44. See PAAA, R78484, document E III 3488, AA registry receipt stamp from 14 Dec. 1923.

45. See PAAA, R78484, telegram no. 264, Foreign Minister Stresemann to German Legation Stockholm, 15 Dec. 1923.
46. See PAAA, R78484, record III E 3454 from Padel (AA), Berlin, 8 Dec. 1923.
47. See PAAA, R78484, telegram no. 2, Schubert (chief of Department III of the AA) to German Legation Stockholm, Berlin, 4 Jan. 1924. On 7 January 1924 the AA learnt that the Turkish newspaper *Tanin* had published news that Turkey and Germany had decided to take up relations officially, to which purpose an agreement would be made (see PAAA, R78485, document III E 63, record from 7 Jan. 1924).
48. See first source quoted in previous note.
49. In detail, Assistant Secretary of State Carl von Schubert instructed the Embassy to answer possible demands that no details whatsoever had been agreed for a German–Turkish friendship treaty as a basis for official relations and that Germany would not send an official representative to Ankara before the main signatory powers of Lausanne had done so (see PAAA, R78484, Schubert (AA) to German Embassy in London, telegram from 4 Jan. 1924).
50. See PAAA, R78484, telegram no. 2 from Schubert (AA) to German Legation in Bucharest (Romania), 4 Jan. 1924.
51. See PAAA, R78485, telegram, Nadolny (German Legation Stockholm) to AA, 5 Jan. 1924.
52. Further attached to the letter was the translation of the treaty of friendship between the Turkish Republic and Poland as an example for such an agreement (see PAAA, R78485, document III E 30/34, AA to German Envoy Freytag in Bucharest, 10 Jan. 1924). A few days later the certificate of authority issued by the German President of the Reich, Friedrich Ebert, followed, providing Ambassador Freytag with the necessary authority to conduct negotiations about the treaty of friendship with Turkey and to sign it (see PAAA, R78485, copy of certificate of authority, issued on 12 Jan. 1924).
53. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 30/34, AA to German Envoy Freytag in Bucharest, 10 Jan. 1924.
54. See PAAA, R78485, document to III E 106, AA to German Embassy in London, 14 Jan. 1924. In the same document the AA also informed the German representative in London that it intended to follow the example of the Great Powers in the question of whether the representation in Turkey should be through an embassy or a legation, and that prior to that Germany was ready for the establishment of a consulate general in Smyrna.
55. See PAAA, R78485, telegram no. 6 from 26 Jan. 1924, Freytag (German Legation at Bucharest) to AA.
56. See PAAA, R78485, telegram to III E 232, Schubert (Assistant Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister) to German Legation in Bucharest, 28 Jan. 1924.
57. See PAAA, R78485, telegram no. 9 to III E 232, von Maltzan (State Secretary to the Foreign Minister) to German Legation in Bucharest, 1 Feb. 1924.
58. See PAAA, R78485, telegram no. 7, Freytag (German Legation Bucharest) to AA, 31 Jan. 1924, received there on 1 Feb. Very likely, this telegram and von Maltzan's telegram crossed.
59. See PAAA, R78485, telegram, von Maltzan (AA) to Diplologerma Bucharest, 2 Feb. 1924.
60. See PAAA, R78485, telegram no. 9, Freytag (German Legation Bucharest) to AA, 3 Feb. 1924.
61. See PAAA, R78485, Freytag (German Legation Bucharest) to AA, 18 Jan. 1924.
62. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 396, telegram, Freytag to AA, Pera, 11 Feb. 1924.
63. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 438, telegram no. 1, Freytag to AA, Pera, 15 Feb. 1924.
64. See PAAA, R78485, Freytag (Section Allemande at Swedish Legation) to AA, Constantinople, 12 Feb. 1924.
65. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 446, telegram, State Secretary von Maltzan to German legation Stockholm, 17 Feb. 1924.
66. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 524, receipt stamp at the AA dated on 23 Feb. 1924.
67. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 569, telegram no. 1, Freytag (Ankara) to AA, 25 Feb 7 19247.
68. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 570, telegram no. 2, Freytag (Ankara) to AA, 27 Feb 7 19247.
69. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 580, telegram no. 3, Freytag (Ankara) to AA, 28 Feb. 1924.
70. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 612, telegram no. 6, Freytag (Ankara) to AA, 3 March 1924.
71. See PAAA, R78485, document to III E 1032, telegram no. 180, Schubert (Assistant Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister) to German Embassy in London, 17 April 1924.
72. For Germany, Legationsrat Padel, the head of the political department dealing with Turkish matters at the AA, was appointed to accompany the document to Istanbul where the actual exchange of

- documents was then performed by Swedish Legate Wallenberg and a representative of the Turkish government (see PAAA, R78495, document to III 1185, Padel to AA, Constantinople, 2 May 1924).
73. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 861, Wallenberg (Swedish Legation in Constantinople) to AA, 23 March 1924.
 74. The distinction between legation and embassy goes back to the Vienna Congress after which the Great Powers (France, Great Britain, Austria, Prussia and Russia) established embassies in each other's capitals. Diplomatic missions in other countries were referred to as legations. Thus the upgrading of a legation to an embassy in a certain country mirrored the rise in international position that particular state had won.
 75. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 1276, telegram no. 255, Sthamer (German Embassy London) to AA, 19 May 1924.
 76. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 1034, telegram no.185, Schubert (Assistant Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister) to German Embassy in London, 19 April 1924.
 77. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 1044, telegram 173, Sthamer (German Embassy London) to AA, 22 April 1924.
 78. See PAAA, R78495, document to III 1039, telegram no. 21, Padel (Constantinople) to AA, 30 April 1924.
 79. See PAAA, R78485, document to III E 1113, record from Schubert (Assistant Secretary of State th the Foreign Minister at the AA), 1 May 1924.
 80. See PAAA, R78485, document to III E 1113, draft for a telegram from Schubert (Assistant Secretary of State to the Foreign Minister at the AA) to the German Embassy in London, 2 May 1924 and PAAA, R78485, document III E 1123, telegram no. 208, Schubert to German Embassy London, 2 May 1924.
 81. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 1123, telegram no. 198, German Embassy London to AA, 3 May 1924.
 82. See PAAA, R78484, document III E 1124, telegram no. 22, Padel (Constantinople) to AA, 3 May 1924.
 83. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 1123, telegram no. 212, AA to German Embassy London, 5 May 1924.
 84. See PAAA, R78485, document III E 1159, telegram no. 205, Sthamer (German Embassy London) to AA, 6 May 1924. The Government in London, however, preferred that at the time being a German legation would be sent to Istanbul only (and not to Ankara, see PAAA, R78485, document III E 1276, telegram no. 255, Sthamer (German Embassy London) to AA, 19 May 1924).
 85. See PAAA, R78485, Nadolny to AA, Constantinople, 4 June 1924.
 86. See PAAA, R78485, document III O 346, Padel (German Consulate General for Anatolia in Smyrna) to AA, 9 Aug. 1924.